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REVIEW ESSAY: WHO KILLED





One of the oldest distinctions in philosophical discourse is that
between "words about words" and "words about things."' Much
scholarship among international lawyers and political scientists, as well
as table-talk of diplomats and other practitioners concerning the somewhat
airy concept of sovereignty, has suffered all too much from a failure to
appreciate the confusion that flows from treating a word as though it were
a fact. Now come to the table two pairs of scholars with contrasting
interpretations of the central word of international law, sovereinty: at one
end, international lawyers Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes; and at the
other, political scientists Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck.
Ironically, however, the lawyers unveil a "new sovereignty" by
employing a variety of social science methodologies to explicate a non-
legal, "managerial" approach to the study of the transfer of state authority
to international institutions. In a converse irony, the political scientists
have appropriated the international lawyer's interpretive canon, parsing
international judicial and arbitral decisions and combing state practice as
evidence of customary international law, to advance an essentially
traditional conception of sovereignty as state sovereignty.
What accounts for this role reversal? Would each set of scholars
be better off cabined in their own disciplines? Happily, the answer to the
second of these questions is a resounding "no," both for Fowler and
Buck's Law, Power, and the Sovereign State2 and for Abram and Antonia
Handler Chayes' The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International
* Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
B.A. 1982, Harvard College; J.D. 1985, Columbia Law School. The author was formerly an
attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser to the Department of State. The views reflected in this
article, however, are his own and should not be understood to represent, directly or indirectly, the
views of the Department of State, any other agency of the U.S. Government, or those of any
international organization. Apologies axe in order to Professor Thomas Franck, for a title that derives
loosely from his Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by
States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
' See BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHLOSOPHY 155, 826-836 (1945)(discussing
Russell's own philosophy of logical analysis).
2 MICHAEL R. FOWLER & JULIE M. BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE: THE
EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995).
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Regulatory Agreements. Both volumes reveal aspects of the emerging
international system and the issues we must all grapple with as we seek
to understand it. More important, their respective efforts to move beyond
their own disciplines says something about the current level of
dissatisfaction within their respective disciplines. This essay maintains
that the lawyers and political scientists are reaching out to insights they
perceive in each others' disciplines because neither the "legal" nor the
"managerial" conception of sovereignty is an adequate rendering of
sovereignty's meaning in international affairs.. Each discipline thus
intuitively borrows from insights that appear to fill the theoretical gaps of
its own methodology. Political scientists, who are ordinarily concerned
with "systems" and their "management" because they focus on problems
from the perspective of collective governance, here reach for "legal"
rhetoric that defines the relation of the individual state to the system of
states. International lawyers, whose traditional ken is defining in "legal"
terms the scope of freedom or area of "private autonomy" individuals
may exercise, here look to "management" of the overall "system" as a
way to reconcile collective state needs with individual state freedom. In
the end, it is simply astonishing to see international relations theorists
advance a defense of sovereignty in terms of its utility in fostering reliable
international commitments,5 while international lawyers deprecate legal
conceptions such as performance and breach of commitments. 6
There is nothing wrong, of course, with the academic effort to
explicate the relationship between the individual and the collective in
terms of sovereignty. But neither the new sovereignty of membership of
states in international institutions nor the old sovereignty of state
autonomy over its resources and subjects can provide complete accounts
of international life or of its future course. Rather, both fail to relate
individual interests to collective needs, with the political scientists
favoring individual autonomy and the lawyers defending collective needs.
A theory of sovereignty should rather mediate between these competing
considerations through the representation of individual interests in
collective governance, perhaps even through a theory of popular
sovereignty; but, in the case of these two books, the political scientists
effectively endorse the power of the military and bureaucratic groups
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
' Cf. Laura S. Underkuffler, Essay: On Property, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 129 (Underkuffler argues
that the domestic law concept of "property, in the historical view, did not represent the autonomous
sphere of the individual to be asserted against the collective; rather, it embodied and reflected the
inherent tension between the individual and the collective. This tension-now seen as something
external to the concept of property-was in fact internal to it.").
5 FOWLER, supra note 2, at 162.
6 CHAYES, supra note 3, at 22.
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currently dominating most state structures and the lawyers explicitly
buttress the role of transnational scientific and cultural elites. This anti-
democratic blind spot may well explain the current malaise in the two
professions, with political scientists spilling ink on regime theory that
international lawyers see as international law and international relations
theory and lawyers killing tree after tree to develop a law of international
institutions that political scientists see as idealist claptrap. In the end, this
impoverished discourse can only widen the gap between the formal
governing authority of international institutions, such as the World Trade
Organization or Security Council, and their democratic legitimacy.'
Would it not be more interesting to think about how individuals, rather
than states, fit into the emerging governing institutions of the post-Cold
War world?
The limits of the usefulness of these two approaches to the study
of sovereignty can best be seen in the context of a case that requires
attention to both the old and new sovereignties: the international response
to North Korea's attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Interestingly, both
Fowler and Bunck and the Chayes mention the North Korean case in
passing. The political scientists emphasize the sovereign rights of
members of the international community to protect their security by
denying nuclear weapons to North Korea. The international lawyers focus
on the international community's progress in managing the problem by
socializing an intransigent state.' As this essay will show, both the
traditional legal rhetoric of performance and breach and the new rhetoric
of management of noncompliance within the nonproliferation regime are
necessary perspectives for describing and explaining the flow of events.
The North Korean case will reveal, perhaps more starkly than most cases,
that the premise of state sovereignty or permanent membership of a
particular state in the international system cannot go unchallenged. Both
the state sovereignty rhetoric of perfomance and breach and the
membership rhetoric of management of noncompliance are superimposed
on the basic substratum of state legitimacy, so that the question of the
sovereignty of the people of North Korea is never far from the surface in
the response to the Korean nuclear issue. A better theory of sovereignty
in international law must eventually address this deficiency in both the old
and new sovereignties.
See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, The Once and Future Security Council, 18 WASH. U. L. Q. 5, 6
(1995)(discussing the "Democracy Deficit" undercutting recent Security Council efforts at world
governance).
' Compare infra note 35 with infra note 62.
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II. THE OLD SOVEREIGNTY
The classical conception of sovereignty, as every beginning
student of international law recalls, draws on the political ideology and
experience of 17th century Europe, the so-called Westphalian conception.9
Feudal conceptions of economy and society reflected the contingent nature
of property relations between king, lords, and serfs."° By contrast, the
Westphalian conception's basic premise was the absolute authority of the
state, particularly the monarch, over its subjects. As political scientist
John Ruggie has argued, this conception was connected to the emerging
market economy of early modern Europe and the pre-capitalist focus on
absolute conceptions of private property it engendered." This early
modem theory of absolute property rights thus generated a particular view
of "sovereignty" emphasizing the ownership by the king or (ultimately
after the dissolution of monarchy) the state of all rights incidental to an
absolute conception of property; that is, the right to use, exclude others'
use, and alienate subjects. Thus, as more limited conceptions of state
sovereignty evolved, such concepts as "condominium" and "mandate"
were best understood as, respectively, kinds of joint ownerships and trusts
drawn from the civil law tradition. 2 Thus property became a kind of
ruling ideology in international law.
In the earliest socialist critique of capitalism, critical and
rhetorical emphasis was placed on the sense in which transformation of
the person's labor into an alienable property interest resulted in an
alienation of the self.'3 Of course, a more modern conception of property
rights unpacks the concept of property as a "bundle" of legally-protectible
9 RICHARD A. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 35 (1981)(descibing a
jurisprudence built around the "will" of the sovereign); THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY (1970)(describing Westphalian jurisprudence of decentralized sovereignty). For a discussion
of the transformation of the Westphalian conception into the U.N. Charter conception of the
international legal order, see Richard A. Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions
of International Legal Order, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 32 (R. Falk
& C. Black eds., 1969).
10 See J.E.A. JOLLIFFE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 139 (4.th ed.
1961) (citing F. POLLOCK & W. MAITLAND, I HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 69). In the feudal regime,
the king asserted "lordship over every acre of land in England, by however many degrees of tenure
it was separated from the throne." Id.
1 See JOHN G. RUGGIE, CONTINUITY AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE WORLD POLITY: TOWARD
A NEOREALIST SYNTHESIS, IN NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 131, 145 (Robert 0. Keohane ed.,
1986)(arguing that the principle linking constitutive units in the international system is sovereignty,
just as the principle linking constitutive units in the modem state system is property, but that neither
principle accounts for how change occurs within states or in the international system).
12 See generally HERSH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1927).
13 See KARL MARX, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL MANUSCRIPTS, IN EARLY WRITINGS 279,
322-34 (1975)(chapter of First Manuscript on "Estranged Labor," where Marx first articulated his
theory of alienation and private property as the expression of alienated labor).
Vol. 14, No. 2 Sovereignty in International Law- . 467
interests in the use or disposition of socially valuable resources. 4 The
modern theory of property rights also focuses on the distributional, as
well as the efficiency dimensions of property-right allocation and
enforcement.' 5 Theories of property, it is now recognized, cannot be
divorced from considerations of procedural justice 6 (and, under a certain
view, substantive justice as well).' 7
Fowler and Bunck articulate two conceptions of sovereignty based
on these theories of property; one they call the "Chunk" theory of
sovereignty; the other the "Basket" theory. Under the Chunk theory,
sovereignty is "monolithic" and "possessed 'in full or not at all'."' 8  This
conception draws from the absolute conception of property that emerged
at the beginning of the Westphalian system, a point which, as we shall
see, Fowler and Bunck give altogether too little attention.' 9 Under the
Chunk theory, they argue, international commitments are not a cession of
sovereignty but rather simply manifestations of its exercise.2" They then
contrast the Chunk theory with the Basket theory, under which
sovereignty is a "basket of rights and duties" such that "theorists
empirically investigate the contents of each political community's basket
14 See generally DUKEMINIER & KRIER, PROPERTY 86 (3d ed. 1993)(stating that property
"consists of a number of disparate rights, a 'bundle' of them: the right to use, the right to exclude,
the right to transfer"); J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 711 (1996) (exhaustively analyzing competing approaches to the "bundle of rights" conception
of property). Penner locates the origins of the "bundle of rights" thesis in Wesley Hohfeld's analysis
of right-duty correlatives. Penner, supra at 712 n.3 (citing WESLEY HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER ESSAYS (Walter W. Cook, ed. 1923)).
"5 See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)(focusing on the
distributional consequences of state largess).
16 See JOHN RAWL.S, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-61 (1971)(relating the legitimacy of substantive
distributional outcomes in a theory of justice concerning domestic distribution of important social
goods to the procedural conditions under which the distribution is achieved).
17 See generally MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrTS OF JUSTICE (1982)(critiquing
Rawls and arguing that it is impossible to fashion an entirely procedural political theory of liberalism,
since principles of justice require some vision of the good).
18 FOWLER, supra note 2, at 64 (citing and quoting INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., NATIONAL
MINORITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 32 (1955)).
11 See infra text accompanying notes 24-34.
20 FOWLER, supra note 2, at 98. Interestingly, for a formulation of Chunk theory, the authors
rely on the current Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and a former
professor of international law, Hans Blix, whom they regard as a Basket theorist. Blix states that
"[t]he voluntary assumption of treaty obligations should not be regarded as a limitation upon but
rather as an expression of the state's sovereignty." Id. (citing HANS Bux, SOVEREIGNTY,
AGGRESSION, AND NEUTRALITY 11 (1970)). This is because the voluntary cession of the sovereign
right is implicitly premised on the ceding state's inital entitlement to possess and exercise the ceded
right. But Blix's argument need not be limited to treaties, since customary law equally involves the
transfer based on tacit consent of such entitlements and even new states might be said to have
consented, although perhaps only on a hypothetical basis, to limits on their sovereignty under
customary law. See LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY 62-142 (1995)(developing arguments
grounded on consent and hypothetical consent to collective intervention under American leadership
in the internal affairs of states).
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of attributes to determine the extent of that actor's corresponding rights
and obligations." 2' They further maintain that their review of the
evidence demonstrates that the Chunk and Basket theories are not, as they
are applied in diplomatic practice, complementary concepts expressing
different aspects of a single theory of sovereignty, but are rather
competing concepts that yield conflicting results in actual cases.'
To international lawyers, however, the ocean which Fowler and
Bunck believe separates the Chunk and Basket conceptions of sovereignty
may be no more than a creek. Both approaches are property-based
1 FOWLER, supra note 2, at 70. Again, Fowler and Bunck rely on Director General Blix's
formulation:
As ownership is described as a bundle of rights, sovereignty may perhaps be described as a
bundle of competencies. There is no inherent reason against the voluntary acceptance of
limitations upon the freedom of action in one field or in several fields, upon one or more of the
competencies in the bundle. Of course, such limitations do reduce the freedom of action of the
state and thereby nibble at the sovereignty-as the concept is defined here. Most of the freedom
will remain, however.
Id. at 71 (citing Blix, supra note 20, at 11-12).
2 Id. at 82. The evidence the authors rely on to establish the dichotomy between the two
conceptions includes, to list only a few, the Case Concerning the Nationality Decrees Issued In Tunis
and Morocco [Gr. Br./Fr.], P.C.I.J. (Ser. B.), No. 4, at 6 (1923)(holding that France could not
exercise its sovereignty over Tunis and Morocco and persons therein to classify British subjects as
French nationals subject to French military service in a manner inconsistent with France's treaty
obligations to Great Britain); the Right of Passage over Indian Territory [Port. v. India], 1960 I.C.J.
6 (Judgment)(giving effect to traditional Portuguese right of access to territorial enclave but not
expanding it to include a right of passage of Portuguese armed forces through Indian territoty to the
enclave without Indian consent); the establishment of the Panama Canal Zone under the Hay -Varilla
Treaty of 1903; and the U.S. lease in perpetuity starting in 1903 of Guantanamo Bay from Cuba.
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conceptions of sovereignty.23 Indeed, both seem to entail a theory of
property mainly as a "relation ... between an owner and a thing," rather
than "between the owner and other individuals in reference to things."'24
It might have been possible for Fowler and Bunck to develop a property-
based theory of sovereignty, particularly a Basket theory, that would
account for the relationships persons have with each other in respect of
objects of state and transnational institutional power. However, in their
review of state practice and legal decisions, Fowler and Bunck treat the
state as though it were a claimant with an entitlement to property rights
over a given territory and the persons and resources within that territory,
leaving little space for a theory of popular sovereignty.
Moreover, their essentially Langdellian interpretive strategy tends
to foreclose the study of democratic considerations. They explicitly seek
to discern which of the two theories of sovereignty most accurately
accounts for the data points of state behavior. They attempt, in their own
words, to give some substance to the word sovereignty that, like a
23 Of course, the distinction between a theory of sovereignty, like the basket theory, that
broadly permits alienation of sovereign rights, and one that, like the Chunk theory, treats sovereign
rights as essential to the preservation of a state's sovereignty does not need to be expressed in terms
of property. See, e.g., David Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 607 (1995). Wippman considers whether a state's contemporaneous consent to foreign
intervention in its civil war can be dispensed with if prior consent has not been effectively revoked.
Id. He suggests that under a freedom of contract model, a state might be free to bargain away its
sovereign rights, including the right against foreign intervention in a future civil war. Id. at 616-18.
This approach is thus compatible with the Basket theory. Wippman also considers ajus cogens model
of sovereignty, under which certain sovereign rights are so much at the core of sovereignty that they
may not be alienated. Id. at 618-23. Jus cogens in international law functions in ways quite similar
to public policy or ordre publique in common and civil municipal legal systems as a limit to the
freedom of contract. C. Geoff Watson, Death of Treaty, 55 OHIO ST. L. J. 781, 817 (1994); see also
ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN AND JAMES R. GORDLY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW, 802-05 (2d ed. 1977). The jus cogens model seems congruent
with the Chunk theory, although they might yield radically different results in application given
vagueness in any formulations that depend on identifying the "core" elements of sovereignty.
Indeed, the diffciulty in stating what is at the center of sovereignty under a contract theory
parallels the most important challenge to hypothetical contract models of moral justification. John
Rawls has famously argued that individuals would agree to certain principles of justice to govern the
basic structure of their state when reasoning in a version of a hypothetical state of nature, with only
minimal assumptions about persons' initial attributes and what would be important to them in an
agreed society. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-50 (1971). However, Rawls' minimal
assumptions, Michael Sandel has replied, fail to account for values, drawn primarily from
participation in communities, that are the "core" of human personality. See generally MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). Contract-based theories of sovereignty,
thus, as Wippman rightly recognizes, demand a deeper inquiry into the identity of the sovereign and
the claims of its constituent communities. Wippman, supra at 623-32. This review essay draws
similar conclusionsin terms of property-based legal vocabulary.
2' See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927)(relying on a
social conception of property rights to argue in favor of a redistributive role for the state in the
communal control of resources to further the public interest); cf. Underkuffler, supra note 4, at 129
(pointing to the dual role of property in defining a sphere of private autonomy and a sphere of
collective interests, but arguing that the two aspects are connected, rather than separate, concepts).
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"Banquo's ghost of the academic feast," hovers over the stage of
international politics. 2  Yet the material out of which they would give
substance to Banquo's ghost is itself rather airy stuff that seems divorced
from flesh and blood. Indeed, they treat the rights of states as though
they were of legal weight, indistinguishable from that which would attach
to similar claims by natural persons.2" In all fairness, Fowler and Bunck
purport to employ an explicitly positivist methodology free of normativity
in order to take the study of sovereignty to a more precise level. Yet one
wonders whether a more complete, accurate, and useful, account of
sovereignty can be achieved without addressing the role of the various
constituencies within states. After all, groups defined in terms of status
and interest comprise states at least as much as certain groups owe their
existence to the protection they receive from the existence of states.
Indeed, Fowler and Bunck might have taken into account the moral status
of claims that groups comprising states (whether one calls them "nations"
or "peoples") may have to a separate identity within a state structure and
the ability to command resources that state power can assure.27 Fowler
and Bunck's limited discussion of Marxist, international organization,
supranationalist, and human rights critiques of sovereignty28 do not do
justice to the descriptive and predictive power of some of these
approaches in explicating the meaning of sovereignty in the new
international order where groups find expression of their powers not only
25 FOWLER, supra note 2, at 3.
26 See, e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. U.S., 429 U.S. 338 (1977)(affirming corporations' Fourth
Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures); First Nat. City Bank of
Boston v. BeUotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)(recognizing corporations' First Amendment right to freedom
of expression). But cf L. Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REv. 487
(1987) (distinguishing between the constitutional rights of aliens and the consitutional rights of foreign
states).
27 See generally Lea Brilmayer, The Moral Significance of Nationalism, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 7, 30 (1995)(observing that we regularly differentiate in the recognition of rights among various
categories of juridical persons and between natural and juridical persons depending on the status of
the particular entity). Brilmayer argues, however, that, with some minor qualifications, the best
approach to the moral status of nationalism is to frame groups' claims so that they are "independent
of the status of the entity making them." Id. at 11. For example, a way to articulate Baltic claims
to statehood is to focus on the historical wrong committed against the Baltic nations through their
forcible annexation by the former Soviet Union rather than in terms of cultural or other unique
dimensions of their existence which merit preservation. Id. at 12. In sum, Brilmayer advances a
kind of "neutral principles" approach to the moral claims of groups to preferential resource
allocations in which corrective justice serves as the principle under which sovereign claims would be
recognized. Cf. H. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 15 (1973)(arguing for reasoning that is "genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step
that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result
that is achieved"). Arguably, however, Brilmayer's formalistic commitment to ocrrective justice
would still require an assessment of whether the victim of a past wrong suffered that hann as a
collective entity. Thus, status questions would seem to be inevitable.
' FOWLER, supra note 2, at 128-140.
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within but also without states.29 A better approach in understanding the
sources of international disorder would then employ the internal politics
model, which is now considered essential to any adequate account of state
behavior.30
But no matter how hard they try, Fowler and Bunck are unable
to avoid the internal politics dimension of sovereignty, although they
reach this point through a circuitous path. They recognize from their
empirical approach that "becoming an accepted member of the ranks of
sovereign states is something like joining an exclusive club," so that "it
is ultimately the international community that determines whether a
particular political entity qualifies as a sovereign state."'" The importance
of recognition in the current state system leads them to observe a
preference among state leaders for employing the Basket theory of
sovereignty.32 Fowler and Bunck then infer from this fact that our theory
of sovereignty should soften its commitment to the doctrine of sovereign
equality, one of the core elements of the traditional doctrine of
sovereignty they have described as Chunk theory, because it undercuts the
ability of the international system to ensure order.33 Finally, and
ironically in a book that pays precious little attention to the domestic
sources of international behavior, Fowler and Bunck conclude that
sovereignty's principal modern justification is its original rationale in the
anarchic pre-Westphalian system that ravaged Europe in civil and
29 See, e.g., THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD 25-26,
30-35 (1995)(suggesting that transnational interest groups such as labor, business, the press and
political parties play an increasing role in global governance).
10 KENNEm WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR 80-123 (1959)(developing three models for
explaining the sources of interstate conflict, including one focusing on the domestic, political and
economic structure of states as a predictor of their propensity toward international violence); cf.
Correspondence: The Democratic Peace, 19 INT'L SECURITY 164-84 (Spring 1995)(an exchange of
views among Bruce Russet, Christopher Layne, David E. Spiro, and Michael Doyle debating the
thesis that democratic states are less likely to engage in international violence than non-democratic
states).
31 FOWLER, supra note 2, at 62. Remarkably, the authors do not allude to the long-standing
debate between proponents of the "declaratory" and "constitutive" theories of state recognition in
modem international law. See, e.g., HERSH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1946)(distinguishing between the view, on the one hand, that an entity meeting the objective criteria
of statehood is a subject of international law with legal rights and duties regardless of whether other
states recognize it as such and, on the other, that the act of recognition by currently recognized states
transforms the entity into a subject of international law). Nor, for that matter, do they address the
recent extraordinary developments relating to collective recognition by the international community
through the United Nations, see Michael Scharf, Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States and
Membershp in the United Nations, 28 CORNELL J. INT'L L. 129 (1995); or the then EC and United
Sates adoption of new criteria concerning international obligations regarding internal affairs as
preconditions for recognition of the republics emerging from former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union.
See LOUIS HENKIN, Er AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 250-55 (3d ed. 1993).
Arguably, this recent practice raises the profile of the dimension of internal sovereignty and its
relation to external sovereignty in ways that Fowler and Bunck do not seem to appreciate.
32 FOWLER, supra note 2, at 124.
3 Id. at 148.
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international wars during the 16th and 17th centuries. That is, state
sovereignty assures order in a world where "terrorists, narcotics
traffickers, and insurgents," among others, will be the chief sources of
"international turmoil." 34 Yet insurgency, terrorism, and underground
economies are, if anything, manifestations of internal tensions in the
structure of the "sovereignty" of any particular state.
Perhaps there is power to Fowler and Bunck's point that conflicts,
such as the international effort to prevent North Korea's acquisition of a
nuclear weapons capability, will continue to be understood best as
contests of power between sovereign states." Their intellectual project
may well be to strengthen the theology of sovereignty as a bulwark
against international disorder and outlaw states. If Fowler and Bunck
really were lawyers, one would have to call them unreconstructed
Austinians. Their understanding of sovereignty as a legal concept
ultimately boils down to a theory that only power matters. 6 Accordingly,
these political scientists' explication of the modern role of sovereignty
fails to address adequately the internal and moral dimensions of state
sovereignty. We are left with nothing more than the image of the state
as some "brooding omnipresence."" One might have thought that the
authors' empirical finding concerning the importance of recognition would
suggest that acceptance in this "exclusive club" of states is based on
something more than machtpolitik. It is here that the international
lawyers begin to lend more substance to Banquo's ghost at the academic
feast.
III. THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY
In a magnificent synthetic effort, Abram and Antonia Handler
Chayes have betrayed the profession of international lawyers, perhaps
rendering obsolete its tired old methodology of pacta sunt servanda,
under which a material breach of a treaty gives rise to rights to responsive
3' Id. at 155.
11 Id. at 157.
36 See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1965).
Indeed, Fowler and Bunck's Austinian jurisprudence flows inevitably from their traditional "realist"
perspective in the study of international relations, which tends to minimize the role of international
institutions as autonomous actors. See, e.g., John T. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of
International Institutions 19 INT'L SECURITY 5 (Winter 1994/95).
"' Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917)(Holmes, J., dissenting). It is again
ironic that Fowler and Bunck see to ignore the central tenet of l-olmsian jurisprudence to see law as
the reflection of concrete social interests rather than abstracted concepts, even as they explicitly rely
the Holmesian jurisprudential insight that words, such as sovereignty, are merely the "skin of a living
thought." FOWLER, supra note 2, at 83 (citing Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 372, 376 (1918)). Surely
an adequate understanding of sovereignty must account for interests of social groups and the
individuals constituting them rather than the intellectual construct of the state.
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measures. 38  The old methodology would treat a "'cause' of
noncompliance" as a lawyer's "defense" to a claim of material breach that
would otherwise give the nonbreaching party a right to terminate the
agreement. In contrast, the Chayes prefer to consider such causes from
the perspective of regime management, 39 analyzed in terms of "the
acceptable level of compliance"4 that would obviate "defection."41 They
argue that the problem of "changing interests over the life of a treaty can
be handled by changes in the acceptable level of compliance rather than
by defection."42  Because they believe the "principal source of
noncompliance is not willful disobedience but the lack of capability or
clarity or priority," it follows that "coercive enforcement is as misguided
as it is costly. '4 3 Thus, "the fundamental instrument for maintaining
compliance with treaties at an acceptable level is an iterative process of
discourse among the parties, the treaty organization, and the wider
public."' Discursive "enforcement" thus becomes for the Chayes the
"' Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 346
(with the precise options available to a nondefaulting party depending on whether the treaty is bilateral
or multilateral and, in the latter case, on whether the nondefaulting party is specially affected by the
breach).
9 CHAYES, supra note 3, at 10.
40 Id. at 17.
41 In regime theory, drawing on the game-theoretic perspective which informs much of the
rational actor analysis of the behavior of regime participants, defection serves as a proxy for material
breach or withdrawal from the regime. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Modem International
Relai'ons Theory: A Prospecusfor International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989)(focusing
particularly on the rational choice, game-theoretic perspective); see also Ann-Marie Slaughter Burley,
International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 Am. J. INT'L L. 205
(1993)(arguing that international lawyers and international relations theorists "should aspire to a
common vocabulary and framework of analysis that would allow the sharing of insights and
information").
42 CHAYES, supra note 3, at 20.
' Id. at 22. The Chayes are remarkably sanguine about the efficacy of transparency-generating
features of international regimes in reducing the incentives to defection that one would anticipate from
the game-theoretic perspective, arguing that if "reassurance works for arms control, where stakes are
highest, it is not too surprising to discover the same process at work in more mundane settings." Id.
at 147.
Id. at 24. Indeed, relying on Abram Chayes' earlier account of the role of public
justification in international politics, see ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS:
INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 104 (1987). The authors now call international
organizations the "focused and intensified arena of public justification." Id. at 125. Discursive
justification is, in their view, deeply rooted in their understanding of law as persuasion, for in "the
new sovereignty, there are too many audiences, foreign and domestic, too many relationships present
and potential, too many linkages to too many other issues" for the need for persuasion "to be
ignored." Id. at 119. See also FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS AND DECISIONS: ON THE
CONDrTONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 214 (1989)(calling
legal reasoning "the process by which assent can be gained to value judgments on reasoned rather
than idiosyncratic grounds"). The Chayes' vision of the character of international law, thus, hearkens
back to a tradition that philosophically is most closely associated with Immanuel Kant's conditions
for peace among nations, see IMMANuEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 85, 93-98 (1795)(Lewis W. Beck
ed. & trans., 1963), and practically with Woodrow Wilson's insistence on open agreements that
would stand the test of public opinion. See EDWARD H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS 1919-
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new deus ex machina in the international system. Thus, "sovereignty no
longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently, in their
perceived self-interest, but in membership in reasonably good standing in
the regimes that make up the substance of international life." 5
A critical assumption underlying this methodology is that
discursive justification is as much a characteristic of international law as
it is of domestic law. ' The Chayes reject the account of regime theorists
who focus on how international institutions facilitate cooperation by
reducing transaction costs,47 and argue that "what is left out of this
institutionalist account is the active role of the regime in modifying
preferences, generating new options, persuading the parties to move
toward increasing compliance with regime norms, and guiding the
evolution of the normative structure in the direction of the overall
objectives of the regime." 48 In this discursive process, the Chayes place
particular importance on mechanisms for "systematic review and
assessment of individual members' performance" that would generate a
"compelling dynamic, engaging the parties in a increasingly detailed and
comprehensive dialogue, not only to identify areas where compliance is
1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 32 (1946)(discussing
Wilson's belief in "the compelling power of reason through the voice of the people").
45 CHAYES, supra note 3, at 27.
46 The assumption is framed as follows:
States (though they must speak through human agents) characteristically talk as though they
regard themselves to be bound by applicable legal norms, as do other collective bodies such as
corporations. Domestic and international laws treat states (as well as certain other kinds of
collective bodies) as "artificial persons" with legal rights and obligations, some of them judicially
enforceable. And students of state behavior, whether in the academy, the press, or public life,
assume that states respond to interests, incentives, and penalties in much the same way that
individuals do. It is no more difficult to explain that states as such feel a general obligation to
follow legal norms than to explain why they respond to 'self-interest.'
Id. at 118 (foomotes omitted). In a single footnote qualifying their remarks, the Chayes rely on
Friedrich Kratochwil's argument that, "[w]hile neither I nor anyone else can deny significant
differences between individual choices and those filtered through a group or organizational channels,
the simplifying assumption here is that the initial metaphor is heuristically fruitful and that it. leads
us to the discovery of important new insights." Id. at 346 (citing KRATOCHWIL, supra note 44, at
10-11).
Thus, what appears to be a statement of fact in the text becomes in the footnotes nothing more
than a convenient fiction. It is remarkable that so thorough and provocative a book is built on a
.metaphor" or "simplifying assumption," without a more "discursive" justification or a discussion
of the limits, understood or potential, of the heuristic selected.
41 Id. at 229 (citing ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 88 (1984); ORAN 0. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE:
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT POLITICS IN A STATELESS SOCIETY 1-3 (1994)). For a recent
example of international law literature employing rational actor models, see Richard Morrison,
Efficient Breach of International Agreements, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 183 (1994)(employing
rational actor analysis, in particular the theory of efficient breach, to account for patterns of
compliance in international agreements).
48 CHAYES, supra note 3, at 229.
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unsatisfactory, but also to develop ways of improving performance in the
future."49  Much of this process, they argue, places at stake the
reputational interests of states and their diplomatic agents for truth-telling,
and arguably invokes the coercive power of shame in assuring compliance
with international commitments. 50
Yet discourse and data are not, as the Chayes recognize, enough
to forge a new sovereignty. The new sovereignty of membership in
international institutions requires international institutions worthy of the
name. It is here that the Chayes betray their deepest convictions. They
argue that international organizations must "shield . . . domestic
bureaucracies with responsibilities within the area of concern . . . from
the control of central foreign policy-making authorities and from other
pressures that might militate against compliance with the organization's
mandate."51 They hold out the alliance between domestic experts and
their foreign and international bureaucratic counterparts, "expert
management" in other words, and high party involvement as the
"common characteristic of successful organizations."52 These experts are
defined by their membership in an expert or "epistemic" community, and
they "use their positions of power to implement the shared beliefs and
policy orientation of the community." 53
Yet these new Platonic Guardians have little, if any, connection
to the broader community that must play a role in democratic political
49 Id. at 229, 249.
' To buttress their claim, the Chayes report their conversation with Ambassador Richard J.
Smith, lead U.S. negotiator for the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
26 I.L.M. 1541, entered into force January 1, 1989 (Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1516, entered into force September 22, 1988); as amended
by Adjustment and Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer, entered into force March 7, 1991 (the London Amendments); and Adjustments and
Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 32 I.L.M. 874
(1992)(the Copenhagen Amendments). Smith asserts that revoking a commitment the U.S. had made
earlier in the negotiating process concerning U.S. foreign aid to facilitate compliance with ozone
reduction targets by less developed countries was "the hardest thing he had ever had to do." CHAYES,
supra note 3, at 274. The Chayes believe that policymakers are similarly subject to the effects of
"social opprobrium." Id. (citing Oran Young, Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Case
and Critical Variables,in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD
POLITICS 117 (James Rosenau and Enrst Otto Czempiel, eds., 1992)). While this is no doubt a
perceptive account of the modus operandi of most diplomats, and perhaps even a few policymakers,
it is not clear that social constraints concerning shame over lack of truth-telling is as pervasive a
cross-cultural characteristic as the Chayes would hope.
I CHAYES, supra note 3, at 280.
32 Id. at 284. The Chayes place particular emphasis on the notion of a "transgovernmental elite
network" in terms of the concept of "epistemic communities." Id. at 279-82 (relying, in particular,
on the work of Peter Haas).
53 Id. at 281.
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legitimization. 4 James Madison saw the politics of "interest groups" as
an essential feature for the flourishing of liberty in the transfer of
sovereignty from fifty separate states to a central government."
Astonishingly, interest groups seem to play no role whatsoever in the
Chayes' cookbook for the new sovereignty, despite their academic
training in a legal culture that has elevated Madisonian federalism to the
highest pinnacle of received wisdom." The Chayes might have remedied
this defect by finding a democratic dimension in transnational
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which they regard as "remedies"
for the "deficiencies of public organizations. "57 But even here, they treat
NGOs as essentially elite-centered institutions, "organizations (usually not
for profit) of people united by their orientation toward a particular public
policy issue rather than their 'selfish' individual interests.""8 There is,
under the the Chayes' vision of the new sovereignty, no theoretical home
for elite representation of non-elites and their "selfish" interests-for a
theory of popular sovereignty.
Whatever one thinks about Platonic Guardianship as a mode of
transnational governance, there is yet another downside to the Chayes'
move toward technocratic elitism. The new sovereignty of "membership
in good standing" is woefully ill-equipped to address fundamental value
contflicts. Indeed, the Chayes seem to acknowledge this point by alluding
to the destabilizing effect that fundamental value conflicts have placed
s' The problem of "popular sovereignty" rears its ugly head in the Chayes' account only
indirectly in a footnote in which, again relying on Peter Haas' work, they observe:
Epistemic communities are distinguished from ordinary interest groups and bureaucracies along
four dimensions: shared principles, causal beliefs, validity tests, and policy orientation. While
the members of interest groups may have shared principles and interests, they do not have a
common knowledge base or causal beliefs. Bureaucrats, however, may have none of these
attributes in common with their colleagues.
Id. at 403 (citing Peter Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, in KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY COORDINATION, 46 INT'L ORG.
201 (Peter Haas ed., Winter 1992)(Special Issue)).
1 JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST, NO. 10 77-84 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961)(considering
the politics of "faction" in assuring liberty and in enhancing federal authority).
5 See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, CASES & MATERIALS ON CONSTITrTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1975).
' CHAYES, supra note 3, at 211. Indeed, the Chayes argue that "NGO's seem to be able to
go over the heads of governments to mobilize a process of public shaming and reputational pressure
unrelated to vote getting or other aspects of domestic political power." Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 252. While the Chayes may be right about the limited role that individuals can play
in pursuing their selfish interests in most existing international organizations, it is worth noting that
the World Bank has recently created an institutional mechanism for private persons to complain that
they have been adversely affected by the Bank's failure to comply with its operational procedures.
See Daniel Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank
Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 553 (1994).
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on the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). 5
In that case, some supporters of the moratorium on whale hunting
regarded the ban as "essential to the preservation of endangered whale
species," an instrumental objective for the larger purpose of continuing
the practice of whale hunting. Meanwhile, others saw it as a reflection
of "a new conception of the purpose of the organization, a purpose that
is itself the product of a new 'deep environmentalist' approach that
regards commercial whaling as morally unacceptable." 6 But what the
Chayes may see as a discrepancy may well be at the core of the
international system. The new sovereignty thus is predicated on the
players preferring to keep the game going, even at the price of losing
hand after hand. Sometimes, however, as the saga of the ICRW reveals,
when the stakes are raised high enough, the players will be prepared to
take their chips home, or credibly threaten to do so, in order to change
the rules of the game to make it one they can win. How complete then
is a conception of sovereignty that minimizes the role of fundamental
values? We might question how satisfying the Chayes' offering to the
academic feast will be in the long run.
IV. A SYNTHESIS OF THE OLD AND NEW SOVEREIGNTIES
Both Fowler and Bunck and the Chayes make passing reference
to the international community's efforts to constrain North Korea's
attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. The political scientists cite North
Korea as a case, like Iraq, in which "the international community would
like to remove the right to develop [nuclear] weapons from the baskets of
[sovereignty] of aggressive states." 6 Meanwhile, the international
lawyers see the North Korean case as support for their thesis that
membership in good standing is so important that "[n]ot even the so-
called hermit state of North Korea has been completely able to resist..
escalating pressure."62 Which view is right? Is the conflict between the
international community and North Korea best understood as a power
contest between sovereign states concerning the performance of legal
obligations or is it a process of socialization in which North Korea
" International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, November 10, 1948, 161 U.N.T.S.
72.
60 CHAYES, supra note 3, at 130. Notably, the new conception seems to have prevailed through
the entry into the organization of states without significant commercial whaling interests and the threat
of coercive measures by an NGO, Greenpeace, against states that did not share Greenpeace's moral
commitments. Id. at 263-64.
61 Id. at 157. They see the case as one that clashes "with the notion that states enjoy a
sovereign right to determine what measures ought to be taken to provide for national defense." Id.
62 Id. at 28.
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becomes a member in good standing in the international community? The
answer is both.
North Korea, as is now widely known, attempted during the late
1980s and early 1990s to embark on a program of nuclear weapons
development after it adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 3 The North Koreans breached the NPT
virtually from the moment they signed by delaying completion of the
required safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency until 1992,' more than half a decade late.6' In March 1993,
North Korea attempted to exercise its right to withdraw from the NPT,
after the IAEA had asserted its right under the safeguards agreement to
inspect certain suspect sites at which the IAEA believed North Korea had
engaged in unsafeguarded nuclear activities. North Korea, under
significant international pressure,' "suspended its notice of withdrawal
from the NPT only hours before it was to take effect." 67 This left the
63 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 487, 729
U.N.T.S. 17 (hereinafter NPT). Under article 1 of the NPT, non-nuclear weapons state parties--that
is, all states that have not "detonated a nuclear explosive device" before January 1, 1967, within the
meaning of article XI-may not "manufacture or acquire" nuclear weapons. North Korea's activities
were clearly such that other NPT parties were concerned about the possibility of this imminent breach
of this crucial obligation; see generally MICHAEL J. MAZARR, NORTH KOREA AND THE BOMB: A CASE
STUDY IN NONPROLIFERATION (1995); MITCHELL REISS, BRIDLED AMBITION: WHY COUNtRIES
CONSTRAIN THEIR NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 239-319 (1995). That said, even though it may not be
certain that North Korea actually crossed the threshold of "manufacture" of nuclear weapons rather
than merely engaged in steps "preparatory" to manufacture, which would not technically have
violated the non-acquisition obligation. See generally MOHAMMED I. SHAKER, 1 THE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY 249 (1980)(the authoritative commentator on the NPT pointing out that
the NPT does not bar "attempts" to acquire nuclear weapons).
14 Article III of the NPT requires conclusion of the safeguards agreement, under which the
JAEA verifies compliance with the peaceful use commitment under the NPT relating to nuclear fuel
cycle activities of non-nuclear weapon states, within 360 days of a state's adherence to the Treaty.
See NPT, supra note 63, at art. 111(4); see Agreement Between the Government of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/403 (May 1992)(entered into force April 10, 1992, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 315 (1994). At
the same time, North and South Korea entered into a Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula, January 20, 1992 (entered into force, February 19, 1992); translated and rep:rinted
in IAEA Doc. GOV/INF 660 and 33 I.L.M. 569 (1994), under which North Korea went beyond its
NPT commitment not to engage in certain nuclear activities, such as enrichment or
reprocessing-which produce weapons-usable nuclear material-outside of safeguards with a
commitment not to "possess facilities" for enrichment or reprocessing.
65 North Korea became a party to the NPT on December 12, 1985. See The United Nations
and Nuclear Non-Proliferation 180 (United Nations Bluebook Series, Volume III). Other states party
to the NPT also have not signed the required safeguards agreement, id. at 177-79, however, none is
known to have engaged in fuel cycle activities for the length of time North Korea did without having
complied with this obligations.
" See generally Antonio F. Perez, Survival of Rights Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty: Withdrawal and the Continuing Right of International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, 34
VA. J. INT'L L. 749 (1994).
67 Id. at 751 n.9 (discussing legal effect of "suspension" of notice of withdrawal).
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international community with a dilemna. On the one hand, it could
pursue to its logical completion a legally-based strategy of insisting on
compliance by North Korea with its obligation to virtually the whole
international community under the NPT, and to the IAEA under North
Korea's Safeguards Agreement, to permit inspection of the two suspect
sites. On the other hand, it could pursue a strategy of bringing North
Korea into "acceptable compliance" with the NPT regime and the Joint
Declaration for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This
apparent dilemma, however, like the tension between property-based and
management-based conceptions of sovereignty, was a false dichotomy, for
the international community pursued both approaches in tandem.
In October 1994, the United States and North Korea concluded an
Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear Issue on the
Korean Peninsula,68 under which the United States undertook to make
arrangements to provide North Korea with a light-water reactor power
plant project having a total generating capacity by a target date of 2003
of approximately 2,000 megawatts. In exchange North Korea, upon
receipt of assurances for the provision of light-water reactors and for
arrangements for interim energy alternatives, would freeze its graphite-
moderated reactors and related facilities, and ultimately dismantle them.69
As Secretary of State Warren Christopher later made clear in testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the substitution of
"proliferation resistant, light-water reactors" would reduce the risk of North
Korea's peaceful nuclear activities leading to the production of weapons-
usable nuclear material.7" That said, Christopher did not ignore the legal
dimension of the dispute, pointing out that North Korean compliance with
the IAEA's earlier special inspection request was an essential part of the
The Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear Issue on the Korean
Peninsula, dated October 20, 1994, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 603 (1995)(hereinafter Agreed
Framework).
69 Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States: Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy:
United States-Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 96, 119 (1995). The
Agreed Framework is not considered an international agreement. It is, rather, merely a political
"undertaking" by the United States, as was made clear by its chief U.S. negotiator Robert Gallucci
in testimony before Congress. See Testimony of Ambassador-at-Large Robert Gallucci Before the
East Asian and Pacific Sub-Committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S.-North
Korea Nuclear Agreement, Federal News Service (Dec. 1, 1994)(observing that the United States was
therefore not legally-obligated to make available funds for the provision of the light-water based
reactors the Agreed Framework envisioned would ultimately be made available to North Korea or for
interim energy supplies to substitute from nuclear energy North Korea claimed it had forborne
through closing down its graphite-based reactors).
70 Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law:
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 366, 373 (1995)(reporting testimony of
Secretary of State Christopher Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 24,
1995).
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Agreed Framework. 7  As the Chayes might observe, Secretary
Christopher deferred to the technical judgment of the IAEA as to what
inspections were necessary for it to carry out its mandate under the IAEA-
North Korea Safeguards Agreement.72 On the other hand, Secretary
Christopher ultimately justified the U.S.'s willingness to accept a delay
in North Korea's compliance, as Fowler and Bunck would point out, in
terms of the "national security" requirements of the United States.73
Although the Agreed Framework was initially the fruit of U.S.-
North Korea bilateral negotiations-in a sense, a contest of sovereign
wills between the two states, which had fought a terrible war a generation
earlier-its key procedural element was, as the Chayes might observe,
that the U.S. would organize "an international consortium" to finance
and supply the light-water reactors project.74 Efforts to create the
consortium bore fruit in the conclusion on March 9, 1995 of the Japan-
Republic of Korea-United States Agreement on the Establishment of the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).7" The
establishment of KEDO thus signaled a move toward institutionalizing the
international response to North Korea's nuclear gambit, since
71 Id. at 374 (stating that "the most important benefit that the North will receive under the
Agreed Framework, the sensitive nuclear components for [light-water reactors), will not be provided
until the North fully complies with its safeguards obligations, which includes accounting for its past
activities").
72 Id. at 375. ("Let me now address the question of when the North would account for its past
activities. It was vital to secure an unambiguous commitment from the North to accept whatever
measures the IAEA deemed necessary-including special inspections-to account for its past nuclear
activities.") In view of legally non-binding character of the Agreed Framework, Christopher must
have regarded a "political" commitment as sufficient under the circumstances. See supra note 68
(Ambassador Gallucci's testimony before Congress to the effect that the Agreed Framework was not
binding under international law); see generally Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of
Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1977).
' Nash, supra note 69, at 375. ("From a national security perspective, when those inspections
were conducted was less critical. The information to be obtained is not perishable. We encourage
the North to accept those inspections even before they are required to under the Framework. But the
more pressing security imperative was to stop plutonium production and secure an agreement to
dismantle North Korea's nuclear program.")
'7 See Nash, supra note 68, at 120 (excerpts from the Agreed Framework). This is not to say
that the strategy articulated by Secretary Christopher involved a radical break between addressing the
North Korean situation as a bilateral U.S.-North Korea or North Korea/South Korea problem and
instead as a conflict between North Korea and international organizations alone. As part of the
Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to "resume its dialogue with the Republic of Korea," and
the United States, in order to facilitate implementation of the Agreed Framework, decided to "open
a liaison office in Pyongyang" just as North Korea decided to open an equivalent office in
Washington. See Nash, supra note 69, at 373 (testimony by Secretary Christopher); see also Nash,
supra note 68, at 121 (excerpting provision II of the Agreed Framework). Also, Christopher noted,
North Korea was "moving forward in discussions with the IAEA to enact additional verification
measures" but North Korea was also "cooperating with American experts to ensure safe storage of
the spent fuel at its Yongbyon nuclear plant -cooperation which has included the first visit by
American technicians to Yongbyon." Nash, supra note 69, at 374. Bilateral and multilateral tracks
thus were equally important parts of the Agreed Framework.
75 34 I.L.M. 608 (1995)(hereinafter KEDO Agreement).
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implementation of the Agreed Framework was now seen as KEDO's
responsibility. 76
Fowler and Bunck might argue that KEDO is simply a vehicle
for the U.S., South Korea and Japan to coordinate their bilateral policies
toward their common enemy.77 For example, it might be suggested that
KEDO is merely an effort by the U.S., Japan and Korea to shield their
own assets from nuclear-related liability by creating an international
dummy corporation. Article XIII(b) of the KEDO Agreement provides
that "No Member shall be liable, by reason of its status or participation
as a Member, for acts, omissions, or obligations of the Organization."78
But this language does not completely shift international responsibility
from KEDO's members to KEDO.79 A better explanation, given the
76 As chief U.S. negotiator Ambassador Robert Gallucci observed in connection with a plea for
international contributions to KEDO so that KEDO could "fulfill its obligations." U.S. Resuming
Work Under N. Korea Pact, WASH. POST, June 16, 1995, at A17.
" Articles VI(a), (b), and (e) provide, respectively, that "[t]he authority to carry out the
functions of the Organization shall be vested in the Executive Board," that "[tihe Executive Board
shall consist of one representative of each of the original Members," and that "[diecisions of the
Executive Board shall be made by a consensus of the representatives of all the original Members."
KEDO Agreement, supra note 74, at 612. Article V(a) defines "the original members" as the U.S.,
Japan, and South Korea, so that each therefore maintains a veto on KEDO's activities. Id. Each state
will, in theory, be able to assure itself that KEDO does not take action that conflicts with its core,
sovereign interests. Other states, by contrast, which under Article V(b) may with Executive Board
approval become members if they "support the purposes of [KEDO] and offer assistance," will be
represented in the General Conference, which under Article VII has only recommendatory powers.
Id.
7 KEDO Agreement, supra note 74, at 615. In its Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water
Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea between the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization and the Government of the People's Republic of Korea, art. XI, entered
into force December 15, 1995) (on file with the author)(hereinafter KEDO-North Korea Agreement),
KEDO did not secure any legal commitment from North Korea with respect to claims against
KEDO's members. Rather, it secured a commitment from North Korea not to bring claims "against
KEDO, its contractors and subcontractors, and their respective personnel arising out of any nuclear
damage or loss," id. at art. XI(3), and to "enter into an indemnity agreement" and "secure nuclear
liability insurance or other financial security to protect KEDO, its contractors and subcontractors"
against "any third party claims in any court or forim arising from activities undertaken pursuant" to
the KEDO-North Korea Agreement from "nuclear damage or loss occurring inside or outside the
territory" of North Korea. Id. at art. XI(2). The liability clauses of the KEDO-North Korea
agreement generally track the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Nuclear Liability for Nuclear
Damage, done at Vienna, May 21, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 727 (1963); and the law of most with major civil
nuclear power programs; see, e.g., the U.S. Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2210, Public Law
No. 85256, 71 Stat. 576 (1988) as amended (amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954); in that they
channel liability for nuclear damage to the operator of the nuclear installation regardless of the
operator's fault or, subject to certain exceptions for "gross negligence" or "intent to cause harm,"
the fault of third parties. See KEDO-North Korea Agreement supra, art. XI(1) and (5). In sum,
KEDO's behavior in this area is consistent with that of an actor independent of the states creating it,
with the caveat that state members must have influenced KEDO to some degree in securing
indemnification from North Korea with respect to KEDO's contractors and subcontractors, which are
likely to be nationals of members of KEDO.
" For example, Article XIII(b) of the KEDO Agreement does not preclude international
responsibility for each of the Member's own conduct that is not based on "its status or participation
as a Member." Thus, claims against KEDO members might be based in part on KEDO-related
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limited effect of this language, is probably KEDO's need to soften the
concern of potential contributors to KEDO concerning this issue.80
Moreover, the nuclear liability-related commitments KEDO subsequently
secured from North Korea are more consistent with the behavior of an
independent actor rather than merely a front for U.S., Japan and North
Korean interests.
Fowler and Bunck, taking a legalistic approach, might even argue
that KEDO has only limited international legal capacity, which Article
XIII(a) of the KEDO Agreement defines as follows:
To carry out its purposes and functions, [KEDO] shall possess legal
capacity and, in particular, the capacity to: (1) contract; (2) lease or
rent real property; (3) acquire and dispose of personal property; and
(4) institute legal proceedings. Members may accord [KEDO] such
legal capacity in accordance with their respective laws and
regulations where necessary for [KEDO] to carry out its purposes
and functions.8 '
Thus, the KEDO Agreement provides that KEDO's legal capacity is not
expressly an "international" legal capacity, so that KEDO might be a
creature of domestic law. Each of the illustrative capacities listed are,
moreover, activities that are ordinarily undertaken pursuant to domestic,
not international, law.
But reading the illustrative list of legal capacities in Article XIII(a)
as limits on KEDO's international capacity, in a misplaced application of
the ejusdem generis canon of interpretation, would be like a reading of a
constitution as though it were a tax code. The use of permissive rather
activities when those activities, such as intelligence collection, would arguably be outside the ambit
of KEDO's enumerated purposes. In addition, it would not appear that KEDO could affect the legal
relationship that KEDO members could have with respect to non-members of KEDO, including claims
those non-Members would have against KEDO's members (such as a PRC claim that the light-water
reactor built by KEDO in North Korea caused damage in China) unless international responsibility
arose in connection with activities for which the non-member accepted the applicability of the
Agreement. Finally, Article XIII(b) does not expressly state whether it refers to liability under
international law, the applicable domestic law, or both. Conceivably, KEDO members might be
liable under applicable domestic law even if no international responsibility arises pursuant to article
XIII(b).
I It is better to read Article XIII(b) as an effort to encourage other states to become members
of KEDO by minimizing the risk of their exposure for nuclear-related liability. A similar problem
has stalled assistance ftom the West to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for safety-related
improvements to nuclear reactors there. See Agreement Betwen the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning Operational Safety
Enhancements, Risk Reduction Measures and Nuclear Safety Regulation For Civil Nuclear Facilities
in the Russian Federation, December 16, 1993, art. IV(providing, inter alia, that the Russian
Federation would bring no claims against, and indemnify from third-party claims, the U.S. and U.S.
contractors for civil liability for nuclear damage arising from U.S. activities under the Agreement)(on
file with the author).
81 KEDO Agreement, supra note 74, at 615.
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than mandatory language with respect to "legal capacity," which serves
as code for the domestic grant of the privileges and immunities that would
otherwise be conferred on international organizations and their agents
under international law, should be read in a broader context. The U.S.
Executive Branch needed, for completely different reasons, to leave the
question of privileges and immunities open until congressional
implementing legislative could be enacted.8 ' The understanding of the
U.S. Congress of these KEDO provisions certainly would not comport
with a restrictive and overtechnical reading."
Moreover, it is clear that KEDO can enter into treaties with states
and other international organizations. Articles 111(e) and (g) provide that
KEDO may "cooperate and enter into agreements, contracts, or other
arrangements with appropriate financial institutions, as may be agreed
upon, for the handling of funds received by [KEDO] or designated for
projects of [KEDO]" and "conclude or enter into agreements, contracts,
or other arrangements, including loan agreements, with states,
international organizations, or other appropriate entities, as may be
necessary for achieving the purposes and exercising the functions of
[KEDO]."83 KEDO's broad objectives include not only "providing for
the financing" for the new reactors "based on the Korean standard nuclear
power plant model"' and "for the supply of interim energy alternatives"85
"I The permissive language with respect to privileges and immunities of KEDO within member
states reflects only the peculiarities of domestic implementation of international law, which in the
case of the United States requires a congressional authorization either specifically approving privileges
and immunities for the international organizations or furnishing assistance to that organization, in
which event the President is authorized by proclamation to give effect to the organization's
international legal status as a matter of domestic law by conferring the applicable privileges and
immunities to the organization and its representatives. See International Organization Immunities
Act, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1988) (defining an "international organization" as "a public
international organization in which the United States participates pursuant to any [article II] treaty ore
under the authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation
for such participation, and which shall be designated by the President through appropriate Executive
Order as being entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities herein provided").
82 As a colloquy between Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs and
Representatives Bennett and Callahan makes clear, the Congress perceived that bans in annual
legislation making appropriations for U.S. foreign assistance on direct or indirect U.S. assistance to
North Korea would preclude an ironclad commitment on U.S. support for KEDO until the next
appropriations cycle. See Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Douglas Bennett Before Foreign
Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Federal News Service, March 15,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File. Because the privileges and immunities issue,
at least for the U.S., is deeply connected ultimately with legislative appropriation for assistance to
KEDO, Article XIII(b)'s permissive language with respect to privileges and immunities should be read
in pari materia with Article XIII(d), which provides that "Implementation of this Agreement in the
Member' territories shall be in accordance with the laws and regulations, including budgetary
appropriations, of such Members." KEDO Agreement, supra note 74, at 616.
83 See KEDO Agreement, supra note 74, Arts. III (e) & (g), at 610.
84 The KEDO Agreement further provides th at financing would be provided "pursuant to a
supply agreement to be concluded between [KEDO] and [North Korea]." Id. at 610. The South
Korean demand that the reactor model would be based on that employed in South Korea was a critical
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but also "provid[ing] for the implementation of any other measures
deemed necessary to accomplish the foregoing or otherwise to carry out
the objectives of the Agreed Framework."86 This latter authorization
gives KEDO vast potential for growth, given the broad objectives of the
Agreed Framework concerning peace and security on the Korean
Peninsula. 7 As the Chayes might argue, given the flexibility they find
in discursive legitimation of evolving strategies in the management of
compliance in international regimes, KEDO's competence is free to grow
as necessary to serve its purposes.
But how KEDO will exercise this independent international
capacity is, as Fowler and Bunck might observe, the more telling
question. In fact, KEDO exercised its capacity to enter into an
international agreement when on December 15, 1995 it entered into the
"supply agreement" between itself and North Korea contemplated in the
KEDO Agreement88 as an international agreement rather than simply a
contract under domestic law. 9 Thus, when KEDO secured the
commitment of North Korea "reaffirming that [North Korea] shall
perform its obligations under the relevant provisions of [the Agreed
Framework of October 21, 19 94 ], ' it arguably transformed North
Korea's "political" obligations under the Agreed Framework into
"international law" obligations. KEDO also arguably reinstituted the
methods of the old sovereignty, whereby the breach of North Korea's
safeguards obligations to the IAEA was transformed into a new legal
obligation for North Korea ultimately to accept special inspections.9 If
barrier to North Korea's negotiations with KEDO. See Riches to Rogues, WASH. POST, Apr. 20,
1995, at A21 (Op-Ed)(noting that the original target date for conclusion of the supply contract with
North Korea would be missed because of this issue); see also Leon Mangasarian, U.S. Official Seeks
E. U. Aid for Nuclear Accord with N. Korea, DEUTSCHE PRESS-AGENTUR, Feb. 8, 1995 (attributing
North Korea's attitude to "national pride").
85 These "energy alternatives" were to be provided specifically "in lieu of the energy from
[North Korea's) graphite-moderated reactors pending construction of the first light-water reactor
unit." KEDO Agreement, supra note 74, at 610.
86 id.
" See Nash, supra note 68, at 121.
" KEDO Agreement, supra note 74, art. II(a)(l), at 610.
"9 See KEDO-North Korea Agreement, supra note 77, at art. XVII(1) (stating that "[tlhis
Agreement shall constitute an international agreement between KEDO and (North Korea], and shall
be binding on both sides under international law.").
90 Id. at preambular para. 4.
" Although one might argue that the "reaffirmation" reaffirms only the political nature of
North Korea's commitments under the Agreed Framework, or that preambular language does not
ordinarily create substantive obligations but is used instead to determine the object and purpose of
operative language in international agreement, see e.g. case concerning rights of Nationals in
Morocco, I.C.J. Reports, 176, 196 (relying on pre-ambular language for evidence of object and
purpose), other clauses in the KEDO-North Korea Agreement specifically implement the Agreed
Framework as a matter of international law. Article 111(1) provides that "as specified in the Agreed
Framework, the provision of the [light-water reactor] project and the performance of the steps
specified in Annex 3 are mutually conditioned." Annex 3 defines the steps to be performed by North
Vol. 14, No. 2 Sovereignty in International Law
so, KEDO's legal rights may well be less than the IAEA's, which has
consistently maintained its right to immediate special inspections.9 Thus,
as the Chayes might point out, KEDO may have redefined the standard
of compliance for North Korea's "membership in good standing" as
something less than the status quo ante under the nonproliferation legal
regime.
Fowler and Bunck might reply, however, that the North Korea's
breach of its legal obligations remains the pivotal concept in framing the
international response. In that sense, the traditional theory of sovereignty
under which North Korea has ceded the nuclear stick in its "bundle of
rights" would be reaffirmed. They could point to the fact that, in
implementing the Agreed Framework, full compliance with North Korea's
legal obligations under the IAEA Safeguards Agreement is required by the
existing nonproliferation regime for implementing the light-water reactor
transfer project. Implementation of the transfer project would entail
nuclear-related exports, and these would need to comply with international
and,' where applicable, domestic law.94 North Korea's failure to permit
Korea in connection with the provision of the light-water reactor project, including continuing the
"freeze on its graphite moderated reactors and related facilities and provide full cooperation with the
IAEA in its monitoring of the freeze" and permitting immediate "resumption of ad hoc and routine
inspections under [North Korea's] safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to facilities not
subject to the freeze." KEDO-North Korea Agreement, supra note 77, at Annex 3(2) & (6).
1 The KEDO-North Korea Agreement may well even concede from KEDO's standpoint-and
perhaps even create an estoppel indirectly against the U.S., Japan and South Korea, since KEDO's
entry into the agreement was based on the consensus decision of its members-that North Korea's
refusal to accept special inspections of the two suspect sites requested by the IAEA was not a material
breach of the IAEA-North Korea Safeguards Agreement. Annex 111(7) of the KEDO-North Korea
Agreement specifically provides that it is only "when a significant portion of the [light-water reactor]
project is completed"-a concept defined in terms of technical criteria set forth in Annex 4-"but
before the delivery of key nuclear components" that North Korea "will come into full compliance
with its IAEA safeguards agreement, including all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA."
These steps certainly will include the "special inspection" previously requested by the IAEA. The
U.S. Congress in appropriating funds for U.S. participation in KEDO may well have made the same
concession in not requiring full North Korean Compliance with all applicable safeguards obligations
as a condition of U.S. assistance to KEDO, and through KEDO, North Korea. See Foreign
Operations, Export Financing and, thus Related Programs Appropriations Act, FY 1996, P.L. 104-
107, 110 Stat. 704 (adopted Feb. 12, 1996) (appropriating funds subject to the condition that, inter
alia, the President determines and certifies to Congress that North Korea is "maintaining the freeze
on its nuclear activities as required in the Agreed Framework").
9 The criteria set forth in the KEDO-North Korea Agreement for North Korea's compliance
seem to reflect less KEDO's interest in securing North Korea's fulfillment of its safeguards
obligations than the needs of the states whose contractors will participate in the project. NPT parties
are required under article III of the NPT not to export nuclear material (reactor fuel) or any of the
items on the so-called "trigger list" of material or equipment "especially designed or prepared for the
production, use or processing of nuclear material" without IAEA Safeguards on the exported nuclear
fuel or trigger list items. See NPT, supra note 63, at art. 111(2); see also Communications Received
From Members Regarding the Export of Nuclear Material and of Certain Categories of Equipment
and Other Material, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254 (1978)(the so-called Trigger List of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group or NSG); see KEDO-North Korea Agreement, supra note 77, at Annex
3(4)(specifically referring to the Export Trigger List of the NSG). Going beyond the requirements
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the special inspection requested by the IAEA could, under the
nonproliferation legal regime, complicate implementation of the light-
water reactor project, particularly since the IAEA has firmly maintained
that North Korea's noncompliance was of sufficient gravity to go to the
heart of the safeguards regime.95 In the end, however, the old
sovereignty of performance and breach has its limits, since there is no
guarantee that KEDO and North Korea will be able to rely on judicial
means to settle their disputes," or that internationally sanctioned coercion
would be a plausible enforcement option.
Yet, the best way to think about KEDO's relationship with North
Korea, given the combination of old and new sovereignty concepts in its
current arrangements, may involve focusing on KEDO's ability, as a full-
fledged international organization with an international legal personality
to develop an independent relationship with North Korea over the course
of time. KEDO's independent relationship with North Korea could
of the NPT, but as a matter of political commitment, the NSG members have stated that they will
not make Trigger List exports, even if the exported items would be subject to safeguards mn the
recipient country, unless IAEA safeguards are also being applied on all peaceful nuclear activities,
so-called Fullscope Safeguards, within the recipient country. See IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/405 (May
1992).
' Annex 3(4) of the KEDO-North Korea Agreement, in fact, provides that "in the event that
U.S. firms will be providing the key nuclear components, the U.S. and [North Korea] will conclude
a bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation prior to delivery of such components." Such
agreements, pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. sec.
2153[hereinafter AEA], may not be concluded without certain assurances from the cooperating
country. These commitments, it turns out, are mutatis mutandis contained in article XIII of the
KEDO-North Korea Agreement, which in that agreement consist of North Korean assurances relating
to "peaceful, non-explosive use" of transferred items and nuclear material "used therein or produced
through the use" of such items;" "physical protection" of nuclear reactors and material; "IAEA
safeguards" on transferred reactors and nuclear material as well as on "nuclear material used therein
or produced through the use of such items" for their "useful life;" no "reprocess[ing] or increase
[in] the enrichment level" of transferred nuclear material or nuclear material "used in or produced
through the use" of transferred items; and no retransfer to third parties by North Korea of "any
nuclear equipment or technology or nuclear material transferred . ., or any nuclear material used
therein or produced through the use of such items" without KEDO's consent. See KEDO-North Korea
Agreement, supra note 77, at art. XlII(l),(3),(4),(5), and (6). Also under sections 126 and 128 of
the AEA, exports of most nuclear-related items could not be licensed if North Korea were in
"material breach" of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Accordingly, North Korea's "full compliance"
with its IAEA Safeguards obligations would be, as is contemplated in the KEDO-North Korea
Agreement, a condition precedent of U.S. participation in the light-water reactor supply project.
11 See Report on the Implementation of the Agreement Between the Agency and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. GOV/2636 (Feb. 25, 1993), reprinted in Report
of the International Atomic Energy Agency: Compliance with Arms Limitation and Disarmament
Agreements: Note by the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Annex 3, at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/48/133 (S/25556)(1993)).
'6 KEDO-North Korea Agreement, supra note 77, at art. XV. Under article XV(1), the parties
have expressly favored dispute resolution through "consultations," and have established an
institutional structure, entitled the "coordinating committee," to do so. Moreover, article XV(2)
permits dispute resolution by an arbitral tribunal only "with the consent of the other side."
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evolve both in terms of its legal rights against North Korea and in terms
of its management of the underlying problem concerning North Korea's
nuclear ambitions and the threat that poses. KEDO's behavior thus may
diverge somewhat from the specific intentions of KEDO's original
members at the time KEDO was created as well as from KEDO's
members' current and future views.97 It is not without significance that
KEDO is headquartered in New York, where it might develop an
institutional culture under the influence of other international
organizations, rather than Washington, where it might be perceived to be
an instrument of the U.S. Government.9" Nevertheless, it is recognized
that "the U.S. will serve as the principal point of contact with [North
Korea]" for the light-water reactor project. "" Indeed, different points of
view seem to be emerging in KEDO's relationship with its members
regarding whether the KEDO role will be a permanent feature of the
international response to North Korea's nuclear program, since KEDO's
existence is predicated, oddly enough, on North Korea's own survival as
a state."eo Conceivably, as more members join KEDO and contribute to
its efforts, pressure may increase for it to follow in the wake of the
remarkably independent behavior of the U.N. and IAEA in their response
97 For example, the KEDO Agreement provided that the "Korean standard nuclear plant
model." See KEDO Agreement, supra note 74, at art. II(a)(1). The KEDO-North Korea Agreement
provides that "the reactor model, selected by KEDO, will be the advanced version of U.S.-origin
technology currently under production." See KEDO-North Korea Agreement, supra note 77, at art.
I(1). It appears KEDO has secured North Korea's agreement to a reactor model compatible with the
Korean standard, which is U.S. designed, but without using a formulation offensive to North Korea.
98 See Leon Mangasarian, supra note 84 (indicating that KEDO would be headquartered in
New York); see also The New Transatlantic Agenda, Vol. 6, No. 49 U.S. Department of State
Dispatch, 894, 895-96, Dec. 4, 1995 (recording the agreement of US-EU Summit to "provide support
to the Korean Energy Development Organization, underscoring our shared desire to resolve important
nonproliferation challenges throughout the world."). The larger thrust of the provisions of KEDO
Agreement is thus to create an international organization that will manage the guts of the international
community's relationship with North Korea in respect of transforming its nuclear program.
9 KEDO-North Korea Agreement, supra note 77, at preambular para. 4.
o A difference of view among the original members of KEDO as to whether North Korea's
itself will survive the Agreed Framework's implementation already seems to be brewing, with the
Washington Post reporting recently, in connection with conclusion of the KEDO-North Korea
Agreement, that:
[ajlthough pleased by the completion of the deal, senior U.S. officials remain skeptical that its
terms will be fulfilled. 'Five years from now, North Korea is not going to be there,' a senior
Defense Department official said last week, referring to a U.S. intelligence assessment that North
Korea's economic troubles could topple its leadership and force unification with South Korea..
T .That forecast is rejected by South Korean officials, however, who say the North may be able
to remain intact for longer than a decade.
John Goshko, North Korea Signs Nuclear Accord; Accord Calls for Construction of Two Light-Water
Reactors, WASH. PoST, Dec. 16, 1995, at A17 (staff writer R. Jeffrey Smith contributed to the
report). It may be that KEDO's ongoing interaction with North Korea will affect the members'
perceptions of the North Korean regime and its future prospects.
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to the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis."0 '
The old sovereignty presumes the existence of North Korea.
Otherwise, North Korea would not be entitled to surrender its right to
nuclear weapons or to claim the right to retain them as a matter of
survival. The new sovereignty also presumes the existence of North
Korea. Otherwise, North Korea could not express its sovereignty as a
participant in international governance through multilateral institutions.
Yet North Korea's existence is ultimately a question answered by the
interest and values of the people of North Korea (and perhaps of both
Koreas). Thus, KEDO, as well as other international institutions, may
need to develop a relationship with the Korean peoples before the
fundamental questions of Korean sovereignty driving the North Korean
nuclear crisis can be resolved.
V. IN SUM: GAPS IN THE THEORETICAL LANDSCAPE
AND THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS
Neither the property nor the membership conceptions of
sovereignty are without merit. Yet, as both the political scientists and the
international lawyers may well recognize, neither is complete. It is this
very incompleteness that drives political scientists to search for property
values to uncover the foundations of the international system and
international lawyers to search for membership values to reveal the
mechanisms of its governance. The property conception, if it gives
priority to relations between owners and their property rather than the
relations between owners and non-owners in relation to property,'0 2
emphasizes the role of initial material resource allocations in the
distribution of international power. But a membership conception, if it
gives priority to membership in expert-knowledge communities,0 3
emphasizes the role of initial human resource allocations in the
101 Michael J. Mazarr has argued:
The international institutions at the forefront of the nonproliferation campaign-the International
Atomic Energy Agency backed by the U.N. Security Council-have developed into often effective
means of pursuing national interest through supranational means. The North Korean case
suggests that global agencies can indeed become strong, independent actors. At several points,
it was difficult to tell whether it was the IAEA or policy makers in Seoul or Washington who
were dictating the agenda of the crisis.
See Michael J. Mazarr, Going Just a Little Nuclear: Non Proliferation Lessons from North Korea,
20 INT'L SEcuRrrY 92, 107 (Fall 1995). Mazaar also notes that the U.S., having stated it would seek
Security Council sanctions against North Korea if the IAEA Director General declared that the
"continuity of safeguards" had been broken, was in the unseemly situation of "imploring" the IAEA
not to make that finding to avoid having to seek U.N. sanctions. Id. at 107-08, n.26.
101 See Cohen, supra note 23.
"I See Haas, supra note 54.
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distribution of international power. Both run the risk of ignoring the
bottom-up pressures that drive transformation in the international system.
Perhaps students of the old and new sovereignties could split the
difference and agree that the transformation from heterogeneity to
homogeneity takes place in the shadow of value conflicts, with each
transformative step taken through a process of careful management. But
a property-conception of sovereignty reinforces diversity, since ownership
is preferentially absolute; a membership-based conception reinforces
conformity, since "good standing" requires observance of community
expectations of compliance. The positions seem irreconcilable.
Is sovereignty then only a word and not a real thing? Diversity
and conformity are inevitably in dynamic tension in the transformation of
a world of independent sovereign states into an interdependent post-
sovereign world, just as they are intentioned in municipal law where the
theory of property serves to mediate the individualist and collectivist
requirements of social organization." Perhaps the best theory of
sovereignty might perform a similar function in international law.
Neither the model of "community of sovereign states" nor one built
around "communities of knowledge-based experts" could capture the
complexity of the tension between autonomy and collectivism. Rather,
transformation must occur in a process that appeals to the domestic
interest groups that find their needs met through transnational institutions:
a political process, in short, built around a politics of interests of groups,
not reified states, and managed by politicians, not technocratic experts.
And isn't that, anyway, what we mean by sovereignty in the age of
democratic triumphalism?1"5 The debate about the place of sovereignty,
then, like the debate about the role of property in the modern state, 106 is
not about to be resolved; it is, rather, the expression of an inevitable
contingency in the nature of things-of rips in the fabric of international
governance that can be resewn only by human action in the political
realm.
See generally Underkuffler, supra note 4, at 142.
105 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN PAGE (1992)(arguing
that world history has reached an endpoint in which democratic capitalism has triumphed,
philosophically and practically, over all other theories and modes of social organization); and W.
Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 866 (1990)(arguing that the relevant conception of sovereignty in the new world order is
"popular sovereignty"). But see Fareed Zakaria, A Conversation with Lew Kuan Yew, FOREIGN
AFFS. 109 (March/April 1994), vol 73, No. 2 (Singapore's longtime leader expressing offering a
critical view of the West's commitment to individual rights over society's interests); and Kishore
Mahbubani, The Pacific Way, FOREIGN AFFS. 100 (January/February 1995), vol. 74, No. 1
(Permanent Secretary of Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs advancing the view that with East
Asia having arrived in the world arena, the next stage in the development of world economy and
society will entail a cultural fusion of Eastern and Western traditions).
0" See Underkluffler, supra note 4, at 147 (stating that "rethinking" the theory of property
becomes a way to rethink our "vision" of the relationship between individual and collective life).
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Sovereignty, in sum, is not primarily, as Fowler and Bunck might
posit, "a word about things"-that is, the things owned by the sovereign
state. Neither is it mostly, as Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes divine,
"a wod about words"-that is, the discourse through which states
participate in international governance. Rather, sovereignty must be
about how persons, who in the past have been objects of state ownership,
become subjects who come to speak for themselves.
